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I. Introduction 
The phrase “environmental refugee” summons a compelling 
image of someone forced to relocate due to climate change.  The 
phrase has been used effectively to raise awareness of such diverse 
problems as the rising sea levels that are submerging some Pacific 
islands,1 as well as the increased impact of natural disasters like 
hurricanes and earthquakes which cause a mixture of temporary and 
 
† Elizabeth Keyes, Assistant Professor, Director of the Immigrant Rights Clinic, 
University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, M.P.A. 
Princeton University, B.A. Carleton College. Thanks to Deborah Weissman and Lenore 
Livingston at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for this opportunity. 
 1 See, e.g., Trevelyan Wing, Submerging Paradise: Climate Change in the Pacific 
Islands, CLIMATE INST. (Dec. 28, 2017), http://climate.org/submerging-paradise-climate-
change-in-the-pacific-islands/ [https://perma.cc/Y674-QXHA]. 
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permanent migration.2  As climate change accelerates, and its 
human costs become ever clearer, it is completely appropriate and 
necessary to respond to these migrations, and a number of 
international initiatives are underway to do so.   
As these initiatives go forward, however, it will be increasingly 
important to be careful and precise about the phrase “environmental 
refugee.”  First, as a legal term, the phrase is dubious.  It implicitly 
harnesses the language, norms, and protections of the United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention),3 which fits only a small subset of climate change 
migrants.  Second, at a time when the Refugee Convention itself is 
under enormous strain, the phrase, with its expansive umbrella of 
applicability, is also problematic from a policy standpoint.  
Regional refugee instruments are often broader than the Refugee 
Convention itself,4 but the Convention is the particular focus of this 
Article.   
This Article begins with an assessment of the circumstances in 
which the word “refugee” is appropriate for climate change 
migrants and demonstrates that while the Convention can and will 
 
 2 See generally, e.g., Sarah Opitz Stapleton et al., Climate Change, Migration, and 
Displacement, OVERSEAS DEV. INST. & U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME (Nov. 2017) (examining 
the links between human mobility and climate change). 
 3 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 62, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. 
 4 For example, the African Union Refugee Convention (“AURC”) includes 
protection for those affected by “events seriously disturbing public order”—a broader 
framework than the individualized approach taken by the UN Refugee Convention. Cf. 
Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1(A)(2) (listing circumstances when an 
individual can be considered a refugee). A case study of Somali migration to Kenya shows 
how the AURC helped provide a framework for Kenya’s response. See Sanjula 
Weerasinghe (UNHCR Consultant), In Harm’s Way: International Protection in the 
Context of Nexus Dynamics between Conflict or Violence and Disaster or Climate Change, 
UNHCR DIVISION OF INT’L PROTECTION at 11 (Dec. 2018), 
https://www.unhcr.org/5c1ba88d4.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX7M-GBY4].  Likewise, the 
Cartagena Declaration encompasses “other circumstances which have seriously disturbed 
public order.”  Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International 
Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984, 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36ec.html [https://perma.cc/3T8B-
8DXG].  Mexico incorporated that broader definition into its domestic law, and the 
framework partly guided the country’s response to Haitian migration after the devastating 
2010 earthquake.  See Weerasinghe, supra note 4, at 66 (citing Ley de Migración [LM], 
No. 9.474, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 22-07-1997 (Mex.) (English translation 
available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3f4dfb134.pdf)). 
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cover individuals in some limited settings, it will be utterly 
inadequate to protect the broader range of populations needing to 
migrate.  Having established these limitations, the Article then 
considers the costs of using the word in other contexts.  Those costs 
include the diversion of resources into the project of expanding the 
Convention, through the slow and arduous work of developing new 
precedents and understandings to protect climate change.  There is 
also a great risk of weakening the international system’s support for 
the Convention itself as it stretches to address problems for which 
it was never designed. The Article ends with a justification for a 
complementary protection regime, and a brief examination of what 
such a regime might look like.  
II. What’s in a Name? 
When we consider the impact of climate change on migration, 
it is clear that the impact spans a broad array of migration choices 
and realities.  It encompasses voluntary and involuntary movement 
and migrations within and across borders.5  It includes the wealthy 
family selling frequently flooded property in South Carolina to 
move away from the coast, and the poor family who has to abandon 
land that is no longer arable in Niger and move to the capital in 
search of a livelihood.  It includes people for whom the harms are 
in the distant future, and those for whom climate change has already 
destroyed their communities or livelihoods. 
Global migration scholar Susan Martin has written a 
comprehensive study of the migration trends related to climate 
change and has laid out existing and inchoate policy responses to 
the same in her 2017 Environmental Change and Human Mobility: 
Trends, Law and Policy.6  In it, Professor Martin creates a helpful 
typology that looks at migration, displacement, and planned 
relocation as distinct phenomena, each of which needs a specific set 
of international policy responses.7  Within migration, she considers 
various drivers: (1) long-term trends like drought (where the land is 
so degraded it ceases to be livable) and rising sea levels (where the 
 
 5 See Stapleton, supra note 2, at 6 (defining terminology related to migration within 
the climate change context). 
 6 Susan Martin, Environmental Change and Human Mobility: Trends, Law and 
Policy, 42 COMP. POPULATION STUDIES 187 (2017). 
 7 Id. at 189. 
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land ceases to be available at all);8 (2) more frequent and intense 
natural disasters, which might lead to both temporary and 
permanent decisions to migrate;9 and (3) political upheavals 
connected to the environment.10 
Each of these drivers merits careful inquiry as we consider 
whether and how climate change migrants might be considered 
refugees.  The Convention definition of a refugee requires not just 
that people face severe harm, but that the harm is happening because 
of a protected characteristic: race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.11  This nexus 
between the harm and the protected characteristic is where a casual 
use of the term “environmental refugee” reveals its imprecision.  As 
Professor Ramji-Nogales has noted (in discussing the binary 
between “economic migrants” and “asylum-seekers”), “[t]here are 
many compelling drivers of migration that do not fall within the 
narrow international legal definition of a refugee.”12  I have 
previously written about such non-binary migrants as being 
“unconventional” refugees and argued, as I will here, that it is better 
to find legal protections and policy solutions that fit these new 
situations instead of trying to stretch an already stressed Convention 
to a breaking point.13 
 
 8 Id. at 191. 
 9 Id. at 195–96. 
 10 Id. at 196–202. 
 11 Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1(A)(2). Convention drafters intended 
that this definition be quite narrow: the narrow availability of asylum was by design. See 
James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 145 (1990). The states drafting the convention needed to balance 
protection with pressures for restriction. Id. As James Hathaway writes:  
The subjectivity of the refugee definition has provided a means of legitimating 
this restrictionist tendency: the strong political and economic links that exist 
between the West and many Third World states of origin have led to a 
predisposition to question the likelihood that those states could reasonably be 
expected to engage in persecutory behavior. . . . As a result, the persecution-based 
standard now poses a major political impediment to the recognition of large 
numbers of refugee claims, humanitarian or human rights concerns 
notwithstanding. 
Id. at 169–70. 
 12 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration Emergencies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 611 (2017). 
 13 See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Unconventional Refugees, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 89 
(2017) (arguing that improving conditions in home countries could be part of a long-term 
strategy towards root causes while a temporary protection regime might be a short-term 
and inadequate solution). 
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Consider the first driver: long-term environmental trends.  
When the Pacific Ocean finally submerges the island of Kirabati,14 
we can imagine its last residents in boats literally seeking a safe 
shore, with incalculable harm done to their well-being in every 
respect.  But who is the agent persecuting the people of Kirabati?  
Under the Refugee Convention, it needs to be either the government 
itself, or a private entity the government is unable or unwilling to 
control.15  Neither applies to the Kirabati situation, where the 
government itself is a victim of a crime for whom culpability is 
highly indirect and attributable to a broad swath of nation-states and 
corporations.16  Even if we posit that those nation-states and 
corporations constitute entities that the Kirabati government is 
unable to control,17 those entities are not motivated to harm the 
people of Kirabati because of their nationality, race, or other 
protected characteristics.  Indeed, a piece of the harm done to 
Kirabati is the sheer lack of consideration it is not motivated by 
hatred but by cruel indifference. 
By contrast, the third-driver, political upheaval, offers more 
obvious possibilities for application of the Convention.  Martin 
writes that: 
 
Competition over natural resources may exacerbate pressures 
contributing to conflict, which in turn precipitates movements of 
people.  Prolonged drought appears to have exacerbated tensions 
in Syria, contributing to the 2011 demonstrations against the 
Assad regime, which in turn led to the protracted conflict that has 
displaced millions of people.18   
 
Similarly, scholars of the Rwandan genocide have noted how 
environmental pressure contributed to the population’s 
susceptibility to anti-Tutsi propaganda,19 leading to persecution on 
 
 14 See, e.g., Mike Ives, A Remote Pacific Nation, Threatened by Rising Seas, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/world/asia/climate-change-
kiribati.html [https://perma.cc/3P5F-PD5W]. 
 15 Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1(A)(2). 
 16 See Ives, supra note 14. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Martin, supra note 6, at 191 (internal citations omitted). 
 19 William B. Wood, Geographic Aspects of Genocide: A Comparison of Bosnia and 
Rwanda, 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 57, 64 (2001) (“In an 
impoverished ‘ethnocratic’ state like Rwanda, ‘ethnicity is also the ruling principle of 
6 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
account of race—persecution that fit within the Refugee 
Convention.20  Drought in the Darfur region of Sudan likewise 
created intense competition for resources that led to the deaths of 
countless Sudanese Christians on account of an interrelated mix of 
political opinions, religion, and race.21  These latter examples tie 
climate change more closely to harms traditionally understood to 
fall within the ambit of the Refugee Convention if not quite directly. 
In between these two examples are subtler situations.  Thinking 
again about Kiribati, while the entire island will be lost in the long-
term,22 in the immediate future, the costs of climate change are born 
unevenly across the population.  Unsurprisingly, the costs are born 
by the more economically vulnerable members of the population 
across the world.  From Kirabati to New Orleans, poorer 
communities live most immediately with environmental destruction 
or on land at greatest risk for natural disasters.23 
These diverging examples show the necessity of fine-tuning 
how and when we believe that the Refugee Convention can apply to 
climate-driven migration.  This Article will offer perspectives on 
how and when the Convention might apply, even to migration 
driven by long-term trends.  There is an obvious importance to 
ensuring that some number of climate-change migrants benefit from 
Convention protection when such protection is legally appropriate.  
After detailing that appropriateness, the Article turns briefly to the 
issue of how an overbroad misuse of the word “refugee” may hurt 
the protection scheme overall.  Finally, the Article considers the 
alternatives to the Refugee Convention framework for addressing 
 
economic and social differentiation’, with ethnic groups then forced to ‘confront each other 
in the process of competition for material and social resources’”) (quoting J. Markakis, 
Ethnic Conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa, in ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE 
HORN OF AFRICA 217, 236 (1993)). 
 20 See id. 
 21 See Julian Borger, Darfur Conflict Heralds Era of Wars Triggered by Climate 
Change, U.N. Report Warns, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2007), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jun/23/sudan.climatechange 
[https://perma.cc/P47Z-TYFU]. 
 22 See Ben Doherty, ‘Our Country Will Vanish’: Pacific Islanders Bring Desperate 
Message to Australia, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/14/our-country-will-vanish-pacific-
islanders-bring-desperate-message-to-australia [https://perma.cc/VBQ6-6YNV]. 
 23 See Suzanne Goldenberg, Climate Change: The Poor Will Suffer Most, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 30, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/31/climate-
change-poor-suffer-most-un-report [https://perma.cc/G5Q7-NAH8]. 
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climate-related forced migration. 
III. Identifying Climate-Change Refugees 
The Refugee Convention will be insufficient to meet the 
migration needs of all climate-change migrants, but it would be an 
oversimplification to dismiss the Convention and its possibilities 
out of hand.  As Sanjula Weerasinghe notes in an important 
UNHCR study of state responses to disaster and climate change, 
 
Sometimes, popular perceptions and narratives on the ‘causes’ 
prompting flight may lead to the disregard of refugee law 
frameworks.  This may be more likely when prominent or 
proximate triggers relate to root causes, which are not regarded as 
traditional causes of refugee flight.  In this context, ensuring 
refugee law frameworks remain within a ‘toolbox’ of responses 
to address cross-border movement in the context of nexus 
dynamics may be a key policy challenge.24 
 
In this section, I will look at a few of the interlocking pieces of the 
refugee definition25 to see whether and how climate change migrants 
can benefit from the Convention’s protections.  As the final section 
of this Article will contend, we must look beyond the Convention 
for protection that will meet the broad demands of climate-change 
migration, but it is clear that in some specific subset of 
circumstances, the Convention will be an important tool. 
A. Persecution: Direct Environmental Harm and Indirect 
Other Forms of Harm 
To merit Convention protection, the harm an individual is 
fleeing must constitute “persecution.”26  As the UNHCR Handbook 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
(“UNHCR Handbook”)27 notes, “[t]here is no universally accepted 
 
 24 Weerasinghe, supra note 4, at 11. 
 25 See Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at 14. 
 26 UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE 
STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS 
OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 ¶ 36 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR 
HANDBOOK].  
 27 Id. at ¶ 51. 
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definition of ‘persecution.’”28  Persecution encompasses threats to 
life or freedom, and has been found in such harms as rape, beatings, 
attempted murder, and threats of these things, among many other 
serious harms.29  Persecution is also inextricably linked to the 
motivation for the actions.  Some acts that may be persecution in 
one context might not be in another, specifically where those actions 
are not motivated by animus or—in language that has evolved 
through U.S. case law—a desire to overcome a characteristic 
deemed “offensive.”30 
Highly relevant to climate-change refugees is whether and when 
discrimination fits under the umbrella of persecution.  The UNHCR 
Handbook states, “[w]here measures of discrimination are, in 
themselves, not of a serious character, they may nevertheless give 
rise to a reasonable fear of persecution if they produce, in the mind 
of the person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and insecurity as 
regards his future existence.”31  Government actions and inactions 
on climate often affect different sub-groups of the country 
differently and are classic examples of discrimination; such 
discrimination might rise to the level of persecution if it means 
members of those sub-groups are reasonably fearful for their future 
existence.32 
The critical piece for whether such fears constitutes persecution 
is whether there is an intentionality to the government’s actions or 
inactions.33  As Professor Gaim Kibraeb states, “[t]he only time 
environmentally-induced displacees may be regarded as ‘refugees’ 
is when the state uses environment as an instrument of political 
oppression.  This requirement exists because at the heart of the 
notion of persecution lies state failure to provide protection.”34  
Even within this concept of protection, there is a spectrum of 
governmental culpability.  At one end of the spectrum, we can 
 
 28 Id. 
 29 Jose H. Fischel De Andrade, On the Development of the Concept of ‘Persecution’ 
in International Refugee Law, 2 III ANUARIO BRASILEIRO DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 114, 
127–28.  
 30 See Pitcherskaia v. I.N.S., 118 F.3d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 31 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at ¶ 55 (emphasis added). 
 32 See Gaim Kibreab, Climate Change and Human Migration: A Tenuous 
Relationship?, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 357, 393 (2009). 
 33 See id. at 385. 
 34 Id. 
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imagine a country where the government forces certain sub-groups 
to bear the brunt of the environmental harm (leaving them in low-
lying, flood-prone areas while other groups are moved to higher 
ground).35  Such discrimination lies at the heart of a refugee claim 
from Kiribati, which failed on other grounds.36  It is also a cousin to 
the kind of discrimination that we see throughout the United States, 
from Hurricane Katrina, where structural racism led to a highly 
disparate impact on New Orleans’ African-American community,37  
to the shores of Alaska where Native Alaskans are struggling with 
little support from the government to save their communities.38  At 
the other end of the spectrum might be a country like Tuvalu, where 
the whole population faces a similar risk, caused by distant forces 
and not by the government itself.39 
Much environmental harm is not a villain-less phenomenon.  As 
Geographer William Wood has written, 
 
Forced ecomigration may be defined as a type of migration that is 
propelled by economic decline and environmental degradation.  
Groups unable to sustain themselves at a minimal level face a 
 
 35 See Shabnam Dastgheib, Kiribati Climate Change Refugee Told He Must Leave 
New Zealand, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/22/kiribati-climate-change-refugee-
told-he-must-leave-new-zealand [https://perma.cc/WQH8-E2PX]. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See Kibreab, supra note 32, at 390 (highlighting the temporary displacement of 
over a million people after Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast in August 2005). 
 38 See FACING THE STORM: INDIAN TRIBES, CLIMATE-INDUCED WEATHER EXTREMES, 
AND THE FUTURE FOR INDIAN COUNTRY, CONFRONTING GLOBAL WARMING REPORT 19 
(Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n ed., 2011) (“Compared to state and local governments, Tribes 
receive much less federal funding and other resources to deal with these [environmental] 
issues. Within federal funding streams, Tribes are either expressly excluded, not 
mentioned at all, or are ineligible for other reasons, leaving a gap that they are unable to 
fill. When the federal government does allocate funding to Tribes, it is often a very small 
percentage compared to funds allocated to other entities.”). 
 39 Leslie Allen, Will Tuvalu Disappear under the Sea?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Aug. 
2004), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/will-tuvalu-disappear-beneath-
the-sea-180940704/ [https://perma.cc/CK3C-DS35] (“Unlike other current or predicted 
environmental catastrophes, Tuvalu’s problem is one that people worldwide are believed 
to create by burning fossil fuels that release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, 
contributing to global warming. In that sense, my habit of leaving lights on around my 
house, in Washington, D.C., a neighbor’s of constantly driving his large SUV to go just a 
few city blocks and another neighbor’s preference for a toasty house in winter would play 
a role in Tuvalu’s fate.”).  
10 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
crisis that is both ecological and economic.  Forced ecomigrations 
result when those conditions become immediately life-
threatening . . . inequitable access to arable land is as much a 
social problem as an environmental one.40 
 
Extreme environmental harms that threaten the existence of sub-
groups of a nation could constitute persecution when the 
government’s policies are explicitly directed at and against those 
sub-groups.  As Professor Kibraeb writes, 
 
This sub-category [of true ‘environmental refugees’] includes 
people who are victimized by an explicit ‘ecocidal’ policies or 
activities of oppressive regimes.  The Marsh Arabs in southern 
Iraq or refugees whose repatriation opportunities are stifled by the 
littering of their homelands with landmines or destruction of 
infrastructure by combatants or government forces . . . . The 
question to ask however is why the Marsh Arabs of Southern Iraq 
cannot be considered political refugees rather than 
‘environmental refugees.’41 
 
I contend that this understanding of persecution is both too broad 
and too narrow.  It is too broad because it encapsulates “state failure 
to provide protection”42 that might not be motivated by any 
impermissible animus.  In Haiti, for example, deforestation has 
made much of the land unlivable, but the government’s failure to 
offer protection against these environmental harms appears not to 
be linked to ethnic or political animus, and extends generally across 
the population.43  While the devastation might be comparable to that 
 
 40 William B. Wood, Forced Migration: Local Conflicts and International 
Dilemmas, 84 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 607, 617–18 (1994) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
 41 Kibreab, supra note 32, at 386. Hussein drained the land that was home to the 
Marsh Arab Shia population under the pretext of “an agricultural improvement plan which 
[would] benefit the people of the region.” Michael Wood, Saddam Drains the Life of the 
Marsh Arabs of Southern Iraq, INDEP. (Aug. 28, 1993), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saddam-drains-the-life-of-the-marsh-arabs-
the-arabs-of-southern-iraq-cannot-endure-their-villages-1463823.html 
[https://perma.cc/AP5Z-AYDB]. 
 42 Id. at 385. 
 43 William B. Wood, Ecomigration: Linkages Between Environmental Change and 
Migration, in GLOBAL MIGRANTS GLOBAL REFUGEES: PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS 42, 55 
(Aristide R. Zolberg & Peter M. Benda eds., 2001) (“Haiti’s alarming levels of land 
2019 ENVIROMENTAL REFUGEES 11 
resulting from intentional ecocidal policies,44 the lack of persecutory 
motivation removes it from the ambit of the Convention’s 
protections. 
However, the understanding is also too narrow.  As we consider 
how these sub-groups might adapt to climate change through 
(perhaps as a first effort) internal migration, we can unfortunately 
envision other forms of harm resulting from the vulnerabilities 
inherent to being forced internal migrants: women and sexual 
minorities settling in urban areas where they face intensified risks 
of gender-based violence,45 or children sent to earn a living in an 
urban area where they face the predations of organized crime.46  In 
these scenarios, the persecution is not directly related to climate 
change itself, but climate change creates the migrations which lead 
to new vulnerabilities to persecution.47 
B. Protected Characteristics and Nexus 
A second set of issues arises when we consider what protected 
characteristics might be at stake.  The Convention requires that 
persecution be on account of one of five protected characteristics: 
race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or membership in a 
 
degradation, exacerbated by decades of misguided agrarian policies, is intertwined with 
desperate living conditions in rural areas and is a major factor in rural to urban migration 
and even emigration from Haiti’s shores. (Catanese 1990-91). Haiti’s over six million 
people have endured successive generations of intensifying poverty, soil erosion, 
deforestation, and shrinking average farm sizes, leaving many peasant families unable to 
meet bare subsistence levels.”). 
 44 Kibreab, supra note 32, at 385. 
 45 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on Int’l Prot.: Gender-
Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 3, U.N. DOC. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 
2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines] (“Gender-related claims have typically 
encompassed, although are by no means limited to, acts of sexual violence, 
family/domestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital mutilation, punishment 
for transgression of social mores, and discrimination against homosexuals.”). 
 46 UNHCR, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized 
Crime, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2010) (“Some gangs, such as the Maras, rely heavily on forced 
recruitment to expand and maintain their membership. They typically recruit young people 
who are poor, homeless and from marginalized segments of society or particular 
neighborhoods.”). 
 47 See UNHCR, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Refugees, Returnees and 
Internally Displaced Persons, Guidelines for Prevention & Response, at 111 (May 2003) 
(noting that even “[a]dopting a gender-sensitive interpretation of the 1951 Convention 
does not mean that all women are automatically entitled to refugee status”). 
12 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
particular social group.48  While it is difficult to disaggregate a 
protected characteristic from the element of nexus, the following 
sections briefly attempt this to show that protected characteristics 
are likely to be found in climate change migration, but that nexus is 
a harder element to meet. 
1. Where the Case Is Easily Made: Political Opinion 
It is evident in many migrations forced by climate-change that 
different protected characteristics are or could be implicated.  
Briefly, climate change will likely give rise to new political groups 
and dynamics and, therefore, to political opinions opposed to the 
direct and indirect government policies and actions on climate-
change.  For example, someone might oppose a government that 
refused to take any adaptive actions, or one that took actions whose 
costs were borne disproportionately by one or more sub-groups of 
the population.  Additionally, a new party might arise with a 
climate-change focus, and its members be perceived as threatening 
to the ruling party. 
In these ways, climate change does not differ at all from political 
opinion claims that arise from a host of other issues already seen as 
cognizable under the Convention.49  An activist or party member 
motivated by a climate-change issue, who fears persecutory 
retaliation from the government because of their political opinions, 
presents a straightforward application of the Refugee Convention.50   
 
 48 Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1(A)(2) (“As a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”). 
 49 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at ¶ 75 (“The co-existence within the 
boundaries of a State of two or more national (ethnic, linguistic) groups may create 
situations of persecution or danger of persecution. It may not always be easy to distinguish 
between persecution for reasons of nationality and persecution for reasons of political 
opinion when a conflict between national groups is combined with political movements, 
particularly where a political movement is identified with a specific ‘nationality.’”) 
(emphasis added). 
 50 See id. ¶ 66 (“In order to be considered a refugee, a person must show well-founded 
fear of persecution for one of the reasons [race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular group or political opinion] stated above. It is immaterial whether the persecution 
arises from any single one of these reasons or from a combination of two or more of them. 
Often the applicant himself may not be aware of the reasons for the persecution feared. It 
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2. Where the Case is More Attenuated: Race and 
Membership in a Particular Social Group 
Other protected grounds raise interesting possibilities, but may 
encounter a nexus problem when trying to fit under the Convention.  
We can imagine, for example, racial sub-groups being harmed in 
particular and uneven ways by climate change.  Likewise, particular 
social groups—including such groups as women—may endure 
special kinds of harms, distinct from the general population. 
Claims based upon membership in a particular social group will 
confront the necessity that any such group be centered on an innate 
or immutable characteristic, and that the group not be defined by the 
harm itself.51  As we consider sub-populations affected by climate 
change, we can imagine a strong social identity building among 
those most affected—but a group defined by that affinity is defined 
by the very harm the group fears.52  Likewise, communities in low-
lying areas or increasingly arid areas may not be centered on an 
immutable characteristic as property ownership and economic 
circumstances are often (perhaps incorrectly, but jurisprudentially) 
considered changeable: people can sell land and move, and people’s 
economic fortunes can rise and fall.53  There will certainly be ways 
to formulate particular social groups that do meet the Convention’s 
requirements; if climate change affects women more than men, then 
 
is not, however, his duty to analyze his case to such an extent as to identify the reasons in 
detail.”). 
 51 See id. ¶ 77 (explaining that refugee status based on a particular social group 
“normally comprises persons of a similar background, habits, or social status” and 
therefore is centered on an innate or immutable characteristic). 
 52 See UNHCR, The Environment & Climate Change: The Nansen Initiative – A 
‘Protection Agenda’ For Cross-Border Disaster Displacement, ¶ 2.2 (Oct. 2015) (“Those 
who cross borders in the context of climate change and disasters would not normally 
qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The 1951 
Refugee Convention speaks in terms of ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’ on the basis 
of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. Therefore, the Convention does not normally apply to the situation of 
persons displaced across borders by disasters and climate change and there are at present 
no widely accepted principles or rules governing their entry and stay in another country.”). 
 53 Well beyond the scope of this Article, this notion of economic mobility deserves 
to be challenged within the refugee framework, as in some societies economic mobility is 
illusory at best, and there is an overwhelming likelihood of people who are born into 
poverty remaining in poverty. See Clionadh Raleigh, Assessing the Impact of Climate 
Change on Migration and Conflict 38 (Social Dev. Dep’t, The World Bank Grp., Working 
Paper) (highlighting that “both internal and international migration is an initial economic 
strain on rural families” suggesting the financial difficulty in migration). 
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the particular social group of “women” would be sufficient (without 
considering the nexus requirement, to which the essay turns 
momentarily).54  The point here is to realize that the social affinity 
of facing this challenge collectively in some sub-group of a nation’s 
population will not be enough. 
Once a protected characteristic is identified, a separate issue 
then arises: nexus, or the need to prove that the feared harm would 
happen because of that protected characteristic.55  This will be 
possible in certain contexts where government policies explicitly 
target communities or groups.  Examples include if one ethnicity is 
forbidden to leave unusable land (like the Bantustan policies in 
apartheid-era South Africa),56 or if fiscal resources for adaptation 
deliberately exclude portions of the population because of their 
political opinions, race, or other protected characteristic.57  The New 
Zealand Supreme Court, while denying a particular applicant’s 
refugee claim, left that possibility open: 
 
[W]e note that both the Tribunal and the High Court, emphasized 
their decisions did not mean that environmental degradation 
resulting from climate change or other natural disasters could 
never create a pathway into the Refugee Convention or protected 
person jurisdiction.  Our decision in this case should not be taken 
as ruling out that possibility in an appropriate case.58 
 
 
 54 See Chaloka Beyani, The Needs of Refugee Women: A Human-Rights Perspective, 
3 GENDER & DEV. 29, 31 (1995) (“It is well known that the definition of refugees contained 
in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees omits the category of sex as a 
ground upon which refugee status may be determined. As a consequence of this omission, 
the claim of women to be protected from persecution on the basis of their sex or gender 
cannot be adequately addressed within the framework of the Convention, which is the main 
instrument governing the protection of refugees in international law.”). 
 55 See Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(i) 
(2012). 
 56 Omar Sattaur, How Apartheid is Destroying South Africa’s Environment, NEW 
SCIENTIST (May 12, 1990), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg12617160-700-how-
apartheid-is-destroying-south-africas-environment/ [https://perma.cc/PH56-E4DE] (“The 
Bantustans were fragile initially with thin topsoil, scarce rainfall and sloping, rocky 
ground. Now, politically enforced overpopulation, labour scarcity and poverty have made 
many of the homelands look more like lunar landscapes than rural communities[.]”). 
 57 Teitiota v. Chief Executive Ministry of Business, Innovation & Emp. [2015] 
NZSC 107, at 13 (N.Z.). 
 58 Id. 
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Another New Zealand Tribunal acknowledged in the AF case that 
nexus could be possible, but denied a claim because of insufficient 
facts in the particular case: 
 
While there is no presumption of non-applicability [of Refugee 
Protection to the climate-change context], no special rules exist 
either.  It is indubitably correct that natural disasters and 
environmental degradation can involve significant human rights 
issues.  Nevertheless . . . the claimant must still establish that they 
meet the legal criteria set out in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee 
Convention (or, for that matter, the relevant legal standards in the 
protected person jurisdiction).  This involves an assessment not 
simply of whether there has been breach of a human right in the 
past, but the assessment of a future risk of being persecuted.  In 
the New Zealand context, the claimant’s predicament must 
establish a real chance of a sustained or systemic violation of a 
core human right demonstrative of a failure of state protection 
which has sufficient nexus to a Convention ground.59 
 
Thus, future cases may provide sufficient factual bases between 
harms feared and a protected ground under the Refugee Convention, 
but they will need to be determined on an individualized basis, like 
the vast majority of refugee claims.60 
And what of policies or harms that are more indirect?  To take 
one example, it is beyond reasonable dispute that structural racism 
explains why African-Americans were more vulnerable to 
Hurricane Katrina’s impacts than any other group in New Orleans.61  
As a theoretical matter, a strong case can be made that the suffering 
that group endured was on account of race.  But the complex factors 
underpinning the reasons why African-Americans overwhelmingly 
 
 59 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, at 65 (N.Z.). 
 60 UNHCR, Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement, ¶ 8, 
(2011), available at https://www.unhcr.org/4da2b5e19.pdf [https://perma.cc/N286-P7ZY] 
(“[I]t is clear that the 1951 Convention may apply in specific situations, for instance, where 
‘victims of natural disasters flee because their government has consciously withheld or 
obstructed assistance in order to punish or marginalize them on one of five [Convention] 
grounds.”).  
 61 See Reilly Morse, Environmental Justice Through the Eye of Hurricane Katrina, 
JOINT CENTER FOR POL. AND ECON. STUD. HEALTH POL’Y INST. (2008) (discussing how in 
New Orleans, “historical patterns of environmental racism” contributed to the 
disproportionate impact that Hurricane Katrina had on African-Americans). 
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lived in flood-prone low-lying areas may be too diffuse and indirect 
to gain actual protection under the Refugee Convention with its 
focus on the risks individuals, not communities, face.62  Likewise, if 
we found that women suffered far more harm than men in a given 
country because they had fewer possibilities of relocating internally 
(from cultural norms to issues surrounding land-title), would that be 
persecution on account of membership in the particular social group 
of women?  Theoretically, yes, but without a specific action directed 
at women because they are women, it would be extremely difficult 
for such women to qualify for asylum were they to flee their 
countries.63 
Asylum law would need to move toward something like the 
disparate impact doctrine in U.S. civil rights law, where there is 
liability even in cases where the discrimination or animus is 
concealed.64  As of now, the doctrine is more analogous to the 
intentional discrimination doctrine, where evidence of intent is 
required.65  The previously discussed AF Tribunal decision 
emphasized the necessity of such an individualized showing by 
holding that the appellant’s facts did not link the climate 
degradation of Kiribati to a particular risk of persecution he 
personally faced.66  The Tribunal noted that conflicts related to 
environmental degradation exist in Kiribati, but stated that in this 
instance, “the appellant himself had not been subjected to any such 
dispute in the past and is not involved in any land dispute.”67 
3. The Impossible Cases: Where No Protected Ground Is 
Claimed 
Some claims for refugee protection have been brought where the 
harm is to an entire population, not to a protected sub-group within 
 
 62 See Refugee Convention, supra note 3. 
 63 See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 45, at ¶ 14. 
 64 Antonelli v. N.J., 419 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Intentional discrimination 
can be shown when: (1) a law or policy explicitly classifies citizens on the basis of race; 
(2) a facially neutral law or policy is applied differently on the basis of race; or (3) a facially 
neutral law or policy that is applied evenhandedly is motivated by discriminatory intent 
and has a racially discriminatory impact.”) (citations omitted). 
 65 See Doe ex. rel. Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524, 543 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that “proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause”). 
 66 See AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, at 72 (N.Z.).  
 67 Id. 
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the population; however, those claims have failed.68  In claims heard 
in New Zealand, migrants from Kirabati’s neighbor, Tuvalu, 
asserted that “[e]xposure to the sea along the coastline makes land 
erosion a serious problem and the country suffers from rising sea 
levels, storms and king tides.  They believe that life will no longer 
be sustainable on Tuvalu because of rising sea levels.”69  While 
finding that the Tuvalu appellant would suffer harm in Tuvalu, the 
Court held that “there is no basis for finding that any harm they do 
face as a result of the adverse impacts of climate change has any 
nexus whatsoever to any one of the five Convention grounds.”70  For 
nations where the entire population is equally harmed by climate 
change, the Refugee Convention will simply be the wrong 
mechanism for seeking refuge.71  This assessment might differ in a 
region like Africa or Latin America that has embraced a broader 
definition of refugee72—but under the Refugee Convention itself, 
claims that do not fit within the five protected categories simply do 
not fall within the Convention’s protections. 
IV. Why Precision Matters 
With application of any convention, statute, or regulation to an 
individual case, precision and care clearly matter, and the Refugee 
Convention is no different.  But in the turbulent international and 
domestic contexts of the early-to-mid 21st century, precision matters 
to the enduring power and availability of the Convention itself. 
There is no question that the Refugee Convention and its core 
obligation of nonrefoulement are under tremendous pressure and, 
often, under attack.73  As racist “nationalist” movements move from 
 
 68 See id. 
 69 Gill Bonnet, Climate change refugee cases rejected, RADIO N.Z. (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/342280/climate-change-refugee-cases-rejected 
[https://perma.cc/5AZR-68PD]. 
 70 Id. (emphasis added). 
 71 See id. 
 72 See UNHCR, Expert roundtable Interpretation of the extended refugee definition 
contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Part B, (July 7, 2014) 
[hereinafter UNHCR, Expert roundtable interpretation] (expanding the definition of 
refugee to include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, security or 
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal 
conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously 
disturbed public order”). 
 73 Andrew I. Schoenholtz, The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and 
Persecuted in the Twenty-First Century, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 86 (2015) (“The Refugee 
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the political fringes to the political mainstream from the United 
States to Germany and beyond, anti-refugee rhetoric has provided a 
reliable source of political power and mobilization.74  Donald 
Trump came to power in the United States in part by stoking the 
fears of an immigrant invasion; his attacks on asylum-seekers in 
particular have been constant and go beyond rhetoric to actual 
policies dismantling the Convention’s applicability.75  Angela 
Merkel’s relative generosity toward Syrian refugees weakened her 
politically and led to the rise of far-right Alternative for Germany.76  
Anti-asylum fervor has stoked racist political movements in 
countries from Austria to Sweden, from France to Poland.77   
In such a context, where even the relatively narrow existing 
framework is under intense stress, using the word “refugee” to 
encompass all climate-change migrants feeds the dangerous 
perception that the world can no longer afford the Refugee 
Convention.  That the numbers seeking its protections are simply 
too big.  In the face of problems that seem overwhelming, too many 
countries have the capacity to simply retreat from handling those 
problems.  In the United Kingdom, fears of being submerged by 
migrants played heavily in the referendum to withdraw from the 
European Union; the issue was never framed as straying from the 
Refugee Convention, but rather limiting the United Kingdom’s 
exposure to its obligations by making it more difficult for possible 
asylum-seekers to arrive in the first place.78  Likewise, in the United 
States, nominal claims of commitment to the Convention co-exist 
with strenuous deterrent measures to limit the United States’ 
 
Convention has spent much of its adult life under attack in both developed and developing 
countries.”). 
 74 See generally Elaina Marie Taylor, The Effects of Political Rhetoric on Refugee 
Policy and Communities in the United States and Germany, EL RIO: A STUDENT RES. J. 
50–51 (2018) (analyzing the United States and Germany’s changes in refugee policy and 
refugee political rhetoric over the last decade). 
 75 See id. at 51–53. 
 76 Id. at 53–54. 
 77 See Daniel McLaughlin, Poles and Czechs Follow Austria and Hungary in 
Rejecting UN Migration Pact, THE IRISH TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/poles-and-czechs-follow-austria-and-
hungary-in-rejecting-un-migration-pact-1.3684210 [https://perma.cc/MN4T-RX56]. 
 78 See Alan Travis, On Asylum and Refugees, Britain Left Europe Years Ago, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/01/how-
britain-hard-stance-refugees-reshaping-european-policy [https://perma.cc/F4VA-Q38K]. 
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obligations.79  The United States has made entry extremely difficult, 
adding tremendous costs (from criminal prosecution to family 
separation) during the screening process and making the interior 
less welcoming as well.80  The United States can thus limit the 
Convention while conceding its continued existence. 
There is much to critique in deterrent strategies—from their 
questionable legality to their misreading of the enduring power of 
the reasons people flee their countries for safety elsewhere.  And 
yet, when we contemplate the subset of climate-change migrants 
fleeing because of the literal unavailability of land, it should be 
clear, even to those who favor deterrence currently, that such a 
strategy has no bearing on these future migrants.81  People may be 
deterred from seeking entry into the United States specifically, but 
deterring them from leaving their home countries is clearly 
impossible as those countries degrade and, in extreme cases, 
disappear.82  If deterrence is impossible, but migrants and advocates 
believe they may seek Convention protections, states’ willingness 
to abide by the Convention—even in its current weakened state—
may disappear entirely.83 
 
 79 See An Overview of U.S. Refugee Law and Policy, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Sept. 
17, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/overview-us-refugee-
law-and-policy [https://perma.cc/QE3Y-HZ9N] (“The prospects for refugees hoping to 
resettle in the United States changed abruptly in 2017 . . . . [T]he Trump administration 
suspended indefinitely the entry of Syrian refugees into the country and lowered the FY 
2017 refugee admissions ceiling from 110,000 (set under the Obama administration) to 
50,000.”). 
 80 See generally SARAH PIERCE, JESSICA BOLTER, & ANDREW SELEE, TRUMP’S FIRST 
YEAR ON IMMIGRATION POLICY: RHETORIC VS. REALITY 1 (Migration Policy Inst. ed., 2018) 
(“The most significant changes to date are the increase and broadening of immigration 
enforcement priorities, the elimination of temporary protections for noncitizens 
implemented by prior administrations, and the reduction in refugee admissions.”). 
 81 See EMILY WILKINSON, AMY KIRBYSHIRE, LEIGH MAYHEW, PANDORA BATRA & 
ANDREA MILAN, CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT: CLOSING THE POLICY 
GAP 3 (Overseas Dev. Inst. ed., 2016) (explaining that forced migrants are those who need 
to leave their homes to avoid severe deterioration in habitat and resources . . . [t]hese 
people may be unable to return due to the physical loss of land, or may need to alter 
livelihood practices or other aspects of living in order to return.”). 
 82 See id. 
 83 See Jane McAdam, Seven Reasons the UN Refugee Convention Should Not Include 
‘Climate Refugees,’ PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT (June 7, 2017), 
https://disasterdisplacement.org/staff-member/seven-reasons-the-un-refugee-convention-
should-not-include-climate-refugees [https://perma.cc/TK6T-GWGP] (“Fifth, there is 
little political appetite at the moment to expand the Refugee Convention. Opening it up for 
renegotiation would most likely result in a far weaker protection framework, with less 
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The Convention matters.  Its protections are critical.  But we 
should not ask it to encompass migrants whose profiles do not fit 
within its parameters.  Doing so may result in weakening 
protections for even those who fit under its protections as currently 
defined, an outcome that must be avoided.  As UNHCR Consultant 
Weerasinghe writes, “[r]efugee law frameworks may form part of a 
‘toolbox’ of options, when multiple frameworks are available to 
provide international protection.  When only one framework 
(refugee, migration, other) is operational, the potential to tailor 
appropriate and differentiated international protection responses is 
constrained.”84  The Convention has a vital place in international 
law, but we need other legal frameworks that fit climate change 
migration specifically, so that we can ensure the long-term survival 
of the Convention.  The next section turns to these ideas. 
V. Unconventional Refugees: When Precision Is Not Enough 
“We can park our chair on the beach as often as we please, and 
cry at the oncoming waves, but the tide will not listen, nor the sea 
retreat.”85 
 
This Article has so far issued a call to not overly rely on a 
refugee convention whose contours are only sometimes applicable 
to climate-change migration, and to find those moments where 
people do fit within its protections.  I have recognized that calling 
climate-change migrants “refugees” has dangerous unintended 
consequences and usurps tremendous energy in trying to shoehorn 
populations of migrants into a legal regime not designed for that 
purpose.  As Professor Ramji Nogales has written, “[l]awyers and 
the broader public engage in arguments about whether these 
migrants fit within the murky legal definition of a particular social 
group rather than engaging in discussion concerning far more 
important questions about who should be able to migrate globally 
and why.”86  As the quote from Robert Winder above suggests, we 
do indeed face an unavoidable new series of forced migrations 
caused by climate change, and as the seas literally will not retreat, 
 
protection for all – including those it currently protects.”). 
 84 Weerasinghe, supra note 4, at 8. 
 85 ZYGMUNT BAUMUN, STRANGERS AT OUR DOOR 5 (2016) (quoting ROBERT WINDER, 
BLOODY FOREIGNERS: THE STORY OF IMMIGRATION TO BRITAIN xiii (2013)). 
 86 Ramji-Nogales, supra note 12, at 614–15. 
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we must craft responses appropriate to the challenge. 
A. Why: The Idea of Duty 
In other work, I have discussed philosophical justifications for 
responding to the challenge, largely grounded in a “weak 
cosmopolitanism,” which forms a middle ground between the state-
primacy approach of Michael Walzer and the open borders position 
of Joseph Carens.87  Weak cosmopolitanism concedes that there are 
special duties we owe to our fellow citizens, but recognizes that we 
may also have duties to non-citizens, including to forced migrants.88 
One source of duty particularly relevant to the climate-change 
context is the role of the receiving state in creating the harm that 
individuals are fleeing.  The countries with the most significant or 
dramatic migrations forced by climate change (e.g. Pacific Island or 
Sahelian nations) are not the countries responsible for global 
warming,89 which is largely driven by the production of greenhouse 
gases.90  Where industrialized countries like China and the United 
States bear a far greater share of the underlying causes of climate-
change migration, political philosophers articulate a justification for 
them to likewise bear a far greater share of providing redress to the 
affected populations.91 
 
 87 See generally Keyes, supra note 13, at 30–45 (“There is a range between 
immigration control that denies all rights and completely open borders with strong 
incentives for migration. This Article adopts such a position: a pragmatic understanding 
of the significance of borders, with limitations on the power of immigration control to deny 
fundamental rights. The middle ground between bounded justice and open borders is 
sometimes labeled moderate or weak cosmopolitanism.”). 
 88 Id. at 34 (“Acknowledging that we are citizens of both our nations and the world, 
this philosophy privileges duties owed to co-nationals, but recognizes a lesser set of duties 
that may yet be owed to non-nationals, such as these forced migrants.”). 
 89 See Johannes Friedrich, Mengpin Ge & Andrew Pickens, This Interactive Chart 
Explains World’s Top 10 Emitters, and How They’ve Changed, WORLD RES. INST. (Apr. 
11, 2017), https://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/interactive-chart-explains-worlds-top-10-
emitters-and-how-theyve-changed [https://perma.cc/9VQP-5KUR] (naming the Top Ten 
Emitters of Greenhouse Gases: China, United States, European Union, India, Russia, 
Japan, Brazil, Indonesia, Canada, and Mexico). 
 90 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2014), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7X8D-JMLN] (“Human influence on the climate system is clear, and 
recent anthropogenic emissions of green-house gases are the highest in history. Recent 
climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems.”). 
 91 See Bayes Ahmed, Who Takes Responsibility for the Climate Refugees?, 10 INT’L 
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A “global harm principle,” laid out by philosopher Shelley 
Wilcox, identifies a duty to compensate those individuals or groups 
harmed by the state’s actions92 and makes such people a priority for 
admissions under the state’s immigration mechanisms.93  Writing 
about refugees specifically, Joseph Carens, the most famous 
proponent of open borders,94 urges that those who disagree with his 
conclusions recognize this duty: “Sometimes we have an obligation 
to admit refugees because the actions of our own state have 
contributed in some way to the fact that the refugees are no longer 
safe in their home country.”95 
The United States has historically recognized such duties in 
limited circumstances. The United States welcome of Vietnamese 
refugees sprang from a recognition of the vulnerability these 
refugees faced as the United States decided to withdraw militarily 
from Vietnam.96  In the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 
Micronesia, United States testing of nuclear weapons brought 
environmental destruction to the Islands.97  As a result,98 the United 
 
J. OF CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES AND MGMT. 5, 19–20 (2018) (“When only 62 
billionaires have more combined wealth than the bottom half of the world population, only 
10 countries are producing 69 per cent of the world’s total of carbon dioxide, and these 
countries are consuming most of the world’s resources and consequently generating more 
wastes, then the least developed and world’s poorest countries carry the burden of the 
polluters in the form of climate-change impacts . . . . [T]he liable or climate polluting 
countries should pay for the victim country’s recovery to bring climate justice.”). 
 92 Jared Keyel, Responsibility to Redress: Global Harm, Obligation and the Afghan 
and Iraqi Refugee Crises, 5 SPECTRA 2 (2016) (clarifying that the state conduct must have 
been a “critically necessary causal factor” in the harm). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Joseph H. Carens, The Case for Open Borders, OPEN DEMOCRACY (2015), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/joseph-h-carens/case-for-open-borders 
[https://perma.cc/LE9T-VV6P]. 
 95 JOSEPH H. CARENS, THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION 195 (2013). 
 96 Max Boot, Trump’s Plan to Deport Vietnamese Refugees Betrays a Sacred 
American Principle, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trumps-plan-to-deport-
vietnamese-refugees-betrays-a-sacred-american-principle/2019/01/02/6cd00c84-0eac-
11e9-831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html?utm_term=.7696667ea936 [https://perma.cc/4EN2-
6DT7] (“The United States establishes a sacred bond with allied states when U.S. troops 
shed blood alongside their own. Deporting Vietnamese refugees would be another betrayal 
of South Vietnam and of America’s own Vietnam veterans.”). 
 97 Robert Alvarez, The Legacy of U.S. nuclear Testing in the Marshall Islands, 
HUFFINGTON POST (2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-alvarez/the-legacy-of-
us-nuclear_b_586524.html [https://perma.cc/4LYK-NAJ4]. 
 98 Compact of Free Association, U.S.-Marsh. Is., Art. VII §177, Apr. 30, 2003, 
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States signed a Compact of Free Association99 with the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands (and a separate one with the Federated States 
of Micronesia).100  Under the Compact’s terms, Marshall Islanders 
who are otherwise admissible101 to the United States can travel 
freely to the United States, but only in “nonimmigrant” status, i.e. 
not on a path to lawful permanent residence of citizenship.102  The 
status permits them to work lawfully, and if other routes to lawful 
permanent residence open up (for example, through marriage to a 
U.S. citizen), they are able to adjust their status accordingly.103 
B. What: Durable Immigration Status 
Unlike contexts where temporary regimes might be adequate to 
address the arrival of “unconventional” refugees, such as civil strife 
and civil wars that create population exoduses, climate-change 
migration demands durable long-lasting solutions.104  When 
repatriation is not possible, temporary regimes result in serious 
inequities.  Here, the experience of Marshall Islanders and 
Micronesians in the United States is instructive.  As noted above, 
the United States made special provisions for their passage to the 
United States, but once here, they have only “nonimmigrant” status, 
which leaves the Islanders in a perpetual limbo.105  As one 
commenter notes in an assessment of the Compact’s immigration 
provisions, “if international relocation of a significant number of 
[Marshall Islands and Micronesia] citizens becomes necessary, the 
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current immigration provisions in the Compacts would be wholly 
inadequate on their own to respond to such a critical situation.”106 
Other temporary responses to forced migration have been 
regimes aimed at ultimately repatriating the migrants.  In the United 
States, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) exists for those already in 
the country who are unable to return home due to civil conflict or 
natural disasters.107  TPS comes with work authorization, but lacks 
other features of immigration mechanisms with goals of 
integration—the goal of TPS is intentionally the opposite, even 
though people may stay many years, even decades, with TPS when 
conditions in the countries of origin do not improve.108  Likewise, 
despite the ability to offer broader forms of refugee protection under 
its domestic law incorporation of the Cartagena Declaration, 
Mexico processed many Haitian migrants post-earthquake as 
temporary one-year visitors authorized to work, but admitted for 
humanitarian reasons and not as refugees.109 
Temporary frameworks may be of use in certain kinds of 
climate-driven migration.  As Professor Martin notes, “[i]n both 
slow onset and acute cases, movement may be temporary, cyclical 
or permanent.  The decision as to whether return is possible involves 
a range of variables, including the extent to which the 
environmental causes – either direct or through other channels–is 
likely to persist or frequently reoccur.”110  In cases where the 
displacement is temporary or cyclical, TPS-style mechanisms may 
be appropriate.111  However, we also know from the outset that in 
many instances, repatriation cannot be the goal or orientation of the 
program, which argues strongly against a TPS-style mechanism for 
those migrants for whom the migration will be permanent.112 
As noted above, African and Latin American nations have 
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committed to more expansive refugee frameworks that could afford 
durable protection to climate-change migrants.113  Within Europe, 
both Sweden and Finland offer protections specifically linked to 
environmental issues.114  Sweden’s asylum system permits 
individualized protection to applicants who cannot return to their 
countries of origin “because of an environmental disaster.”115  
Finland offers something similar, for those whose “need for 
protection” is “because of an . . . environmental disaster.”116  While 
New Zealand—which has been denying climate-related claims 
under its refugee framework—contemplated an environmental 
refugee visa, it ultimately rejected that plan.117 
The international community is grappling with such alternatives 
in various ways, many largely focused on sharing and encouraging 
state-level approaches, as opposed to generating a new Convention 
or Protocol.  Professor Martin provides a comprehensive view of 
these approaches in her writing, including the Cancun Adaptation 
Framework which considers the three kinds of climate-change 
migration, and the complex responses required for each,118 and the 
Nansen Initiative.119  The Nansen Initiative has encouraged states to 
consider complementary protection regimes in light of climate 
change, in part by uncovering practices from around the world “that 
complement refugee and other humanitarian protection regimes in 
use by countries in protecting those who are displaced by natural 
disasters and other forms of environmental change.”120  The third 
framework Professor Martin assesses is the Migrants in Countries 
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in Crisis (MCIC) framework, which created guidelines and 
catalogued practices in a similar way to the Nansen Initiative, but 
led by the most affected countries themselves.121 
Climate-change migration has the possibility of opening up new 
ways of thinking about forced migrations.  Unusual in humanitarian 
frameworks, there is a solidarity among countries, as many are 
grappling with internal climate-change migration and adaptation.  
As we consider how to absorb migrants from regions and nations 
whose inhabitability is in sharp and rapid decline, we can think 
about the post-Katrina experience in the United States, where 
migrants who could not return to New Orleans integrated into 
communities like Houston without creating massive localized 
distress (beyond short-term emergency responses).122  After decades 
of seeing the refugee framework as divided between countries 
“creating” or sending the refugees, and countries receiving the 
refugees, this shared experience marks a profound change. 
That change has not yet resulted in widespread popular 
discourse about the duties owed to climate-change migrants.  
Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Maldives, being the most immediately 
impacted, have been vocal, demanding, and creative about urging 
that discourse.123  Countries like New Zealand, Sweden, and Finland 
are responding.124  It is beyond time for the countries most 
responsible for climate change to join these conversations and 
create immigration mechanisms that respond to the coming 
migrations. 
 
 
 121 See id. at 209–11. 
 122 AUDREY SINGER & WILLIAM H. FREY, KATRINA AND RITA IMPACTS ON GULF COAST 
POPULATIONS: FIRST CENSUS FINDINGS 1 (Brookings ed., 2006) (“This analysis provides a 
“baseline” portrait of the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on population shifts and 
changing characteristics in the Gulf Region in the immediate months after the storms hit”); 
see “New Orleans West”: Houston is Home for Many Evacuees 10 Years After Katrina, 
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/25/new-orleans-west-
houston-hurricane-katrina [https://perma.cc/4VJB-6UMQ]. 
 123 See Martin, supra note 6, at 200. 
 124 See id. at 199–200. 
